Finding a Happy Ending for Foreign Investors: the Enforcement of
Arbitration Awards in the People’s Republic of China
By Ellen Reinstein
INTRODUCTION
Since China opened its doors to foreign trade in 1978, foreign businesspeople have
increasingly become involved in Chinese economic development. Foreign investors have
now formed partnerships with their Chinese counterparts involving licensing, trade, and
direct investment. China, in turn, has embraced the development and its benefits to its
citizens.
While the world welcomes this increase in business opportunities, foreign investors
and privately owned Chinese companies seek a stable environment and guarantees for fair
trade. These guarantees are often hard to obtain, due to China’s cultural skepticism towards
the law, its one-party political system, and its underdeveloped court system. Chinese and
foreign investors often fear that Chinese courts will not provide adequate protection for their
investments.
To avoid the unpredictable and sometimes corrupt Chinese court system, these investors
might add to their contracts a clause which specifies that contractual disputes will be settled
through arbitration. But when one party refuses to pay the arbitration award, and that party’s
assets are located in China, enforcement of that award must come through Chinese courts.
Investors end up in the same court system they initially sought to avoid and may encounter
tremendous difficulties in recovering the promised award. 1
Chinese leaders now recognize the importance of its judiciary to further economic gains,
and have promoted several very important recent changes in Chinese law and society. In
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particular, the highest Chinese court, the Supreme People’s Court, has passed numerous
regulations in the last five years in an attempt to address the longstanding problems faced by
foreign parties in the Chinese court system. Legislation now also provides for domestic
arbitration tribunals to accept arbitrable disputes involving a foreign party, which has increased
the competition among and perhaps the quality of arbitral bodies in China. In addition, China
has recently cracked opened its doors to permit the operation of foreign legal programs within its
borders, increasing foreign dialogue and training among judges.
With these many changes, it is important to determine whether there has been an
objective increase in foreigners’ ability to enforce arbitration awards in China, or whether these
attempts at change are mere posturing and quick-fixes. Equally important, perhaps, is whether
foreign and Chinese parties sense a subjective increase in fairness in their treatment within
China. Indeed, many scholars still insist on a complete overhaul of the Chinese judicial system,
claiming that these changes provide a mere “band-aid” on the massive problems continuing to
face Chinese courts. Regardless of one’s view, whether optimistic or nay-saying, the
development of investment and business relations in China in future years may hinge on China’s
ability to reform its court system, cultural attitudes and image to successfully enforce these
awards and increase the confidence of foreign investors.
In part A of this paper, I will briefly describe the history and development of arbitration
in China, and the reasons behind its amazing rise in popularity in contracts involving Chinese
businesses. In part B, I will discuss the different types of arbitration awards and the reasons why
parties often encounter difficulties enforcing those awards in the Chinese courts. In part C, I
outline the Chinese judicial system and the traditional method of enforcing arbitral awards. Part
D will address the attempts made by Chinese judges and lawmakers to confront these challenges,

1 Jun Ge, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the People’s Republic of China, 15
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 122 (1996) at note 1.
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as well as the attempts to measure the improvements, if any, caused by these changes. Finally,
part E discusses changes that I believe are necessary to ensure the success of enforcing arbitral
awards, and possible vehicles to implement those changes.

A. Development of Mediation and Arbitration in China
Mediation, or conciliation,2 has been utilized in China to resolve civil disputes for over
two thousand years. China’s widespread preference for avoidance of the courts has led to its
high utilization of arbitration. As a result, China has some of the biggest and most widely
utilized arbitration bodies in the world. The Chinese preference to use extra-legal means is
largely due to three factors: Confucian philosophy, an underdeveloped court system, and the
influence of communism. 3 In addition, the relationship-based systems of mediation provides
insight into extra-judicial means of enforcing arbitration awards which will be discussed later in
the paper.
Mediation is believed to have developed in China due to the influences of Confucian
philosophy and social morality. Confucianism is a philosophic model that has dominated
Chinese history. Confucius viewed China as a patriarchy, with the leaders in control as the
father and the citizens as the children.4 Just like in a family, the father can accord his
children any rights as he deems fit, but the children have no inalienable rights.5 In addition,
Confucius believed that any conflict or litigation between people brings disharmony, which

2 There is very little distinction between “mediation” and “conciliation.” One scholar stated, “The differences
between the methods [in mediation and conciliation] are slight and the benefits or drawbacks accruing to either
method seem negligible.” James T. Peter, Med-Arb in International Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 83
(1997) at note 1.
3 See Ge, supra note 1, at 126; see also Michael T. Colatrella, Court-Performed Mediation in the People’s
Republic of China: A Proposed Model to Improve the United States Federal District Courts’ Mediation
Programs, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391 (2000).
4 Telephone Interview with Robert J. Reinstein, Dean, Temple University School of Law, Dec. 2, 2001.
5
Id.
3
C:\Mofodocs\Chinese Arbitration Paper\ChineseArbitrationPaper3.05.doc

is harmful to social relationships.6 Ethical behavior, known as li, was embodied in moral and
customary principles of polite conduct.7 The alternative, fa, represented law and regulation.
Confucius held a low view of the law.8 While the law was useful in that it could be used to
convict and execute people, Confucius did not believe that fa could teach people humanity,
kindness, compassion and benevolence.9 Chinese law became mainly penal in nature, with
highly developed criminal codes and procedures.10 In the meantime, civil law was rare, as
people tended to avoid pursuing li-disrupting litigation.11 Compromise, or yielding (termed
jang), became the preferred method of resolving conflicts, and mediation was widely
utilized.12
The court system in China has traditionally been inaccessible and inadequate for most
Chinese citizens.13 The magistrates sometimes had no legal training and were often
corrupt.14 Litigants generally distrusted the courts, making popular the expression “win your
lawsuit and lose your money.”

15

Citizens embraced alternative dispute resolution as a way to

avoid the corrupt court system.
Furthermore, Chinese leadership has traditionally embraced mediation. Until 1949,
the village and family elders of each town generally took responsibility for dispute resolution
in China. The elders sought to restore harmony and grant concessions through mediation.16
Mao Zedong, the leader of Communist China, agreed with these principles of mediation,
believing the promotion of social harmony and the common good of the society should be
6 Robert Perkovich, A Comparative Analysis of Community Mediation in the United States and the People’s
Republic of China, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 313, 314-15 (1996).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9

10 Urs Martin Lauchli, Cross-Cultural Negotiations, With a Special Focus on ADR With the Chinese, 26 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1045, 1059 (2000).
11
See Colatrella, supra note 3, at 397.
12
Id.; see also Ge, supra note XX, at 123.
13
Colatrella, supra note XX, at 397.
14
Id.
15 Id.
16 Amanda Stallard, Joining the Culture Club: Examining Cultural Context When Implementing International
Dispute Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 463, 477 (2002).
4
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emphasized over individual interests. Disputes were resolved through mediation by People’s
Mediation Committees, which also had the responsibility to “educate” the people and help to
implement party policy. 17
Because of these influences, Chinese society does not focus heavily on promulgating
individual rights through an adversarial system. Instead, mediation focuses on the good of
the whole, seeking to understand the other party’s position and reach an agreement that
benefits both parties.18
Mediation is also based on social morality, appealing to the parties’ reason and
emotion rather than to laws or regulations. Examples abound of successful mediations where
mediators found creative solutions to the problems based on social morality. Professor
Stanley Lubman cites several examples:19
Two brothers disputed over the division of family property for 14 years. The
mediation committee director engaged in heart-to-heart talks with the brothers,
assisted them with their needs and recalled their goodwill in the past. They
reconciled and renounced their bitterness, and continued their business
relationship.
An eighty-year-old woman intended to commit suicide because none of her four
sons would support her. A mediator talked with them many times, but they would
not listen to him. The mediator himself took care of the woman for months, and
his deeds moved her sons to acknowledge their wrongdoing. They divided
responsibility for their mother’s care.
Urs Martin Lauchli, an international dispute resolution consultant, also gave several
examples of traditional dispute resolution in China:20

In one dispute involving the marital problems of a husband and wife, which
included allegations of abuse by the wife, the mediator suggested that the couple
go to Beijing for a holiday. “The matter was resolved when the husband
expressed regret that he abused his wife.” In another instance, after mediation, an
17 Id. at 388.
18
Id.
19 STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO, Stanford University Press
(1999) at 231-32.
20 See Lauchli, supra note 6, at 1066.
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unmarried woman who had become pregnant agreed to write a “self-criticism”
and pay a fine. In a third instance, a grandson was angry with his grandmother
over her living arrangements. The neighborhood mediation “committee met with
the disputants and reminded the grandson that his grandmother, who was ninetyfour years old, did not have long to live and that he should therefore try to make
her happy.” (Footnotes omitted.)

Traditional mediation did not adhere to the rule of law, but instead encouraged creative
solutions to fit the individual parties’ circumstances.
The use of mediation in China has recently been declining, while arbitration and
judicial resolution have become more popular.21 With an increase in globalization and an
accompanying complexity in forms of disputes, mediation committees may not have the
expertise to resolve the dispute nor have jurisdiction over the parties. 22 Contracts between
foreign parties may not involve repeat players, and higher monetary values are at stake.23 In
addition, Chinese society has become more rights-conscious, and parties use courts to protect
rights and seek compensation for infringement of rights.24 One survey showed that villagers
have become increasingly willing to sue other citizens and bypass the local mediation
committees.

25

The rejection of mediation has led to a recent increase in arbitration in China. For
most Chinese, arbitration strikes an appropriate balance between mediation and litigation.26
Arbitration tribunals are viewed as less confrontational than litigation, appealing to the
Confucian philosophy and Communist principles.27 And the flexible nature of arbitration
also can allow parties to more easily resolve disputes.28

21

22 Stanley Lubman, International Commercial Dispute Resolution in China: A Practical Assessment, 4 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 107, 236 (1993).
23 Id.
24
Id.
25 Id.
26
27

Fredrick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Transnational Disputes: A Survey of
Trends in The People’s Republic of China, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 329 (1997).
28 Id.
6
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Many foreigners also prefer arbitration as a fair and efficient vehicle for resolving
disputes. Foreign parties might view the Chinese judicial systemas lacking commercial
expertise in resolving business contracts, adhering to slow and complex court procedures, and
practicing local protectionism, as discussed below. Arbitration is usually cheaper and faster than
the court system. 29 Equally important, foreign investors utilize arbitration clauses in an attempt
to avoid the Chinese court system, which is widely perceived as corrupt and ineffective, tending
to favor the Chinese party.30
B. Arbitration bodies and awards in China
China began to open its borders to international trade in the early 1980’s. Several ad
hoc arbitral bodies developed in China in the early 1980’s. These arbitration bodies
presented a variety of problems to the disputing parties.31 The bodies did not have unifying
concepts or principles. Arbitration was not certain or predictable, as the finality of arbitral
decisions varied considerably, as did relations between each arbitral body and the court
system.32
After over a decade of experimental arbitration, the National People’s Congress
(NPC) passed the Arbitration Law of the PRC (Arbitration Law), effective September 1,
1995.33 The Arbitration Law established uniformity between arbitral bodies, provided a
procedural code, set a high standard for arbitration personnel, and gave arbitral awards more
finality.34 The law also outlined the relationship between arbitral bodies and the courts, and
defined arbitrable transactions. 35

29 See, e.g., DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE PRC: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION IN
CHINA, Asia Law & Practice Ltd. (1992) at 25.
30
Interview with Zhao Shiyan, attorney at law, Jingtian & Gongcheng, in Beijing, China (Nov. 2, 2004).
31
32
33

Ge Liu & Alexander Lourie, International Commercial Arbitration in China: History, New Developments, and
Current Practice, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 551-52 (Spring 1995).
34
Id.
35 See Brown, supra note XX, at 342.
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There are several different types of arbitral awards in China: foreign, foreign-related,
or domestic. Foreign arbitral awards are awards made outside of China,36 while foreignrelated awards are awards made by international arbitration bodies in China and/or awards
that involve a foreign element.37 A foreign element may include a case where at least one
party is a foreign person, organization, or enterprise; the creation, modification or
termination of the contract between the parties occurred in a foreign country; or the action
was brought in a foreign country.38 Domestic awards involve Chinese parties and subject
matter only relating to China. These disputes are beyond the scope of this paper, as they are
regulated by different laws.
a. Current arbitration bodies
Two main international arbitration bodies in China handle foreign- and foreignrelated disputes: the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC) and the China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC).39 In addition, Chinese
domestic arbitration tribunals have greatly expanded within the last decade, and now may
accept foreign- and foreign-related disputes. The rapid and extensive development of these
domestic tribunals further demonstrates the demand for this type of forum within China and
its importance to the Chinese government.

36 See generally Chang, supra note 29.
37
See Randall Peerenboom, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the
People’s Republic of China, 1 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 12, 52 (2003) (“Evolving Regulatory Framework”). A
dispute between two Chinese parties may be foreign-related when the object of the dispute is outside China or where
the legal relationship between the parties was established, modified, or terminated outside China. See also Neil
Kaplan, Roundtable on Arbitration and Conciliation Concerning China: HKIAC’s perspective (paper prepared for
presentation at the 17th ICCA Conference, May 16-18, 2004). Mr. Kaplan is the chairman of the Hong Kong
International Arbitration Centre.
38 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note XX, at 52.
39
CMAC, created to resolve maritime disputes, only handles approximately twenty cases per year. Charles K.
Harer, Arbitration Fails to Reduce Foreign Investors’ Risk in China, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 393 (1999). This paper
will focus mainly on CIETAC.
8
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i.

CIETAC

CIETAC has undergone several changes in name and function before establishing
itself as an international arbitration commission. In 1956, the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) founded the Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission (FTAC) to handle trade disputes.40 In 1980, FTAC was renamed the Foreign
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, as its jurisdiction was broadened to include
non-trade economic matters.41 Then in 1988, CCPIT further expanded the body’s
jurisdiction to encompass disputes arising out of international economics and trade, and
issued new rules that brought the body’s procedures more into line with international
practices. Reflecting the increased jurisdiction, CCPIT assigned the arbitration body its
current name.

42

CIETAC is now one of the largest commercial arbitration centers in the world, having
arbitrated nearly 8,000 disputes between 1993 and 2003.43 This high case load and
popularity is due to several factors. Until 1996, the Chinese government authorized CIETAC
as the only international commercial arbitration center in China.44 Chinese parties not
familiar with international business practices are more likely to name CIETAC as the
designated arbitration commission.45 In addition, increasing trade with Chinese businesses
may correspond with an increase in arbitrable disputes. Finally, Chinese regulations
recommend that Chinese parties involved in certain types of disputes apply to CIETAC for
arbitration.46
ii.

Domestic Arbitration Tribunals and the Beijing Arbitration
Commission

40
41

42 See “Roundtable,” supra note XX.
43
See Liu, supra note XX, at 542.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
9
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CIETAC and other foreign arbitration organizations are now encountering
competition for foreign and foreign-related cases from domestic arbitration tribunals.
China’s current domestic arbitration system was created only ten years ago, through the
passage of the 1995 PRC Arbitration Law (“Arbitration Law”).47 Among other things, the
Arbitration Law mandated the establishment of local arbitration commissions.48 In 1996, the
State Council authorized domestic arbitration commissions to accept foreign-related cases.49
The location and scope of these commissions have grown tremendously, from seven “trial
cities” in 1995 to approximately 170 commissions now operating in cities throughout
China.50 The commissions vary widely in case experience, expertise among arbitrators, and
independence from local government influences.51 The commissions located in major cities
are reported to be more financially independent.
The Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC) is considered to be China’s “flagship”
domestic arbitration institution, and is the national focal point for communication and
training among the various domestic commissions.52 The BAC is reported to be 100% selfsufficient, meeting its operating expenses from arbitration fees.53The BAC accepted 1029
cases in 2003, and has accepted over 4000 cases in total since its inception in 1995.54
Although the vast majority of the BAC’s cases involve domestic disputes, the cases
involving foreign-related disputes and foreign parties are growing. It is nowactively
pursuing foreign markets.55 The BAC now has specialists in the International Federation of
Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) among its arbitrators to address issues in international
47

Arbitration Law, Art. 14; Jerome A. Cohen and Adam Kearney, Domestic Arbitration: The New Beijing
Arbitration Commission, § 3.02 IV-3.2-3.3, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA (Freshfields ed. 2000) (“New BAC”).
48
Id.
49
See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note XX, at 12.
50
See “New BAC,” supra note XX, at 3.2; “Introduction to the BAC,” supra note XX.
51
Id.
52
See “New BAC,” supra note XX, at 3.2.
53

54 “Introduction to the Beijing Arbitration Commission,” 17th ICCA Conference (May 16-18, 2004)
(“Introduction to the BAC”); DONALD CLARKE & ANGELA DAVIS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA: THE
ARBITRATION OPTION, China 2000 (2000), available at http://www.asialaw.com/bookstore/china2000/.
55
Wang Hongsong, “Beijing Arbitration Commission 2001 Work Summary and 2002 Work Plan,” available at
http://www.bjac.org.cn/en/brow.asp?id=133 (last visited Dec. 13, 2004) (“2001 Work Summary”); see also
“Introduction to the BAC” (“The BAC has also been attaching prime importance to the building of arbitrator
systems with reference to international practices.”).
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construction projects, particularly in light of the development in preparation for the 2008
Olympic Games in Beijing.56 In addition, the BAC has an extensive and accessible website
translated in English, which highlights its latest developments, including mandatory training
sessions for newly appointed and untrained arbitrators, its recently compiled Arbitrators’
Manual, and its publication stating the ethical standards for BAC arbitrators.57 BAC also
appears willing to adjust its procedures to accommodate foreign parties. For example, after
foreign parties objected to the BAC’s limitation that only two attorneys representing a party
are allowed in the courtroom at a time, the BAC agreed to relax that requirement.58
Arbitrating with the BAC is attractive for several reasons. The BAC claims that the
average duration of cases from formation to conclusion is a mere 79 days.59 In addition,
parties might specify arbitration with a domestic tribunal which contains arbitrators they are
familiar with or arbitrators with a particular specialization.60.
iii.

Competition between CIETAC and BAC

Given the recent addition of quality domestic tribunals such as the BAC, CIETAC
faces stiff competition over foreign- and foreign-related disputes. In addition, CIETAC
practices have recently come under attack by scholars, particularly law professor and
practitioner Jerome Cohen of New York University. CIETAC, realizing the necessity of
addressing these critiques, has adopted some of the changes suggested by Prof. Cohen and
disputes the necessity of other changes.
Prof. Cohen has assaulted CIETAC practices during the past decade. Prof. Cohen
claims that CIETAC permits the appointment of staff persons as presiding arbitrators, which
could arguably allow for the exercise of administrative influence and control over the panel’s

56

See “Introduction to the BAC,” supra note XX.
Id.; see also “Ethical Standards for Arbitrators of the Beijing Arbitration Commission,” effective March 1, 2004,
available at http://www.bjac.org.cn/en/brow.asp?id=699 (last visited Dec. 13, 2004).
58
See “New BAC,” supra note XX, at 3.15.
59
See “Introduction to the BAC,” supra note XX.
60
Interview with Wang Chenguang, Dean, Tsinghua University School of Law, in Beijing, China (November 2,
2004); see also “Introduction to the BAC;” “2001 Work Summary.”
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decision.61 It appears Prof. Cohen’s critique has been heeded, for Cao Lijun claims that
CIETAC now requires that “all staff members … decline appointment by parties unless it is a
joint appointment as a sole or presiding arbitrator.”62 Mr. Lijun further asserts that CIETAC
staff members can only be appointed by the CIETAC chairman when the parties have
defaulted in making an appointment.63
Prof. Cohen also questions CIETAC’s current practice of allowing its arbitrators to
serve as advocates in other CIETAC cases breeds too much familiarity and diminishes
institutional integrity, particularly given China’s existing “guanxi” practices.64 Instead, he
suggests, CIETAC should amend its rules, as the BAC has, to require all those serving as
arbitrators to cease serving as advocates in other CIETAC cases.65 CIETAC has not directly
addressed this concern. However, Dr. Wang Sheng Chang, Vice Chairman of CIETAC,
states that the statistics on the outcome of decisions by CIETAC arbitrators contradicts Prof.
Cohen’s claim of any resulting bias from CIETAC tribunals against foreign parties.66
Prof. Cohen has also critiqued CIETAC for permitting arbitrators to assign the
drafting of the published opinion to the CIETAC staff.67 Dean Wang suggests that this
situation is being addressed by CIETAC, as the CIETAC administration is now asking
arbitrators to spend more time on the hearings, meeting two or three times if necessary, and
to write the award judgments themselves.68 Indeed, Mr. Lijun claims that CIETAC now
encourages the tribunal to play a larger role in administering the case and now requires
members of the tribunal, in particular the presiding arbitrator, to draft the award.69

61

Jerome A. Cohen, “International Commercial Arbitration in China: Some Thoughts from Experience,” Address at
the International Economic Law and China In Its Economic Transition Joint Conference (Nov. 4 and 5, 2004) (“Int’l
Address”).
62
See E-mail from Cao Lijun, Arbitrator and Staff Member, CIETAC, China (Jan. 31, 2005, TIME PST) (“Cao email 1/31/05”).
63
64

See “Int’l Address,” supra note 61. Professor Cohen also notes that, while CIETAC will honor an arbitration
clause specifying that the presiding arbitrator be from a third country, CIETAC does not advertise or encourage this
option.
65
Id.
66
See “Roundtable,” supra note 193.
67
See “Int’l Address,” supra note 61. In comparison, the BAC requires arbitrators to do their own work. Id.
68
See Interview with Wang Chenguang, supra note XX.
69
See Cao Lijun e-mail 1/31/05, supra note XX.
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Aside from these procedural issues, CIETAC and the BAC offer their own
advantages and disadvantages. CIETAC is well- established in the business community and
is generally well-respected.70 It has relied on income earned from administrative fees instead
of receiving funds from the government for almost 20 years, demonstrating its independence
from the government.71 Parties are able to designate a specific foreign arbitrator to sit on the
panel, as CIETAC’s panel of arbitrators includes 146 foreign nationals from nearly 30
different countries.72 In comparison, the BAC claims to have “Chinese and foreign
professional” experts, but it is uncertain whether the arbitrators are actually from foreign
countries or are merely Chinese arbitrators authorized to hear foreign disputes.73
CIETAC claims new areas of expertise which could assist the resolution of certain
types of contracts, having established the Domain Name Dispute Resolution Center in 2001,
and the Future Transaction Dispute Resolution Center in 2003.74 CIETAC officials claim
that courts will give deference to CIETAC awards, given CIETAC’s forty-year history and
courts’ greater familiarity with the institution.75 And Dean Wang has mentioned that
enforcement of CIETAC awards can be less problematic than domestic awards, as the
application of SPC interpretations are more clearly applicable to CIETAC awards than to
domestic awards.76
On the other hand, BAC offers several potentially persuasive advantages over
CIETAC, particularly for smaller commercial disputes.77 BAC’s procedure is relatively

70

Id.
See “Roundtable,” supra note 193.
72
See Roundtable, supra note 193.
73
See “Introduction to the BAC,” supra note XX; “New BAC,” supra note XX (“Although there are currently six
individuals from Hong Kong and two from Taiwan on the BAC roster, there are no foreign arbitrators on the list and
no plans to appoint foreign arbitrators in the foreseeable future, primarily due to financial constraints.”).
74
See Roundtable, supra note 193.
75
Cao Lijun asserts:
It is true that CIETAC awards, whether domestic ones or foreign-related ones, receive more deference in
the enforcement or annulment proceedings. Most of CIETAC arbitrators are distinguished legal scholars,
practitioners or retired judges and their qualities are reflected in their decision-making. CIETAC is the
most reputable institution in China. The awards are also subject to the scrutiny of CIETAC before they are
officially rendered. I believe all these contribute to the deference.
Cao Lijun e-mail 1/31/05.
76
See Interview with Wang Chenguang, supra note XX.
77
See “New BAC,” supra note XX, at 3.22.
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speedy, with an average duration of 79 days from the beginning to the conclusion of a case.78
In addition, the fees for BAC arbitration are relatively less expensive than for CIETAC.79
This choice could benefit a smaller company which is already familiar with and specifies an
arbitrator listed with the BAC.
There are currently no statistics indicating whether parties involved in foreign
disputes are staying with CIETAC arbitration or switching to domestic tribunals such as the
BAC. It appears CIETAC has accepted fewer overall cases as a result of the 1996 Notice,
which could potentially be caused by competition from the local arbitration commissions.80
But the statistics are not available to decipher whether those involved in foreign disputes
have chosen not to arbitrate with CIETAC, or whether they are, for example, specifying other
international arbitration bodies or other dispute resolution methods such as mediation.
iv.

Ad-hoc bodies

Chinese courts appear to have taken a new approach to the final type of arbitration
within China, ad hoc arbitration. Chinese law has traditionally held as void arbitral
agreements issued by a body not administered by a recognized arbitral institution.81
Furthermore, Article 18 of the Chinese Arbitration Law specifies that, if an arbitration clause
does not select an arbitration commission or does not reach a supplementary agreement
regarding the commission which is chosen, the arbitration agreement will be void.82 Due to
the New York Convention, Chinese courts usually recognize and enforce ad hoc awards
made in a Convention State.83 However, it is unclear whether Chinese courts will
acknowledge and enforce ad hoc awards made within Mainland China.84 Peerenboom

78

See “Introduction to the BAC,” supra note XX.
See “New BAC,” supra note XX, at 3.22.
80 Mauricio J. Claver-Carone, Post-Handover Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between
Mainland China and Hong Kong SAR: 1999 Agreement vs. New York Convention, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS.
369, 401 (2002).
81
See Kaplan, supra note XX.
82 See Claver-Carone, supra note XX, at 392.
83
See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note XX, at 13.
84
Id.
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predicts CIETAC will oppose acknowledgement of ad hoc awards in an attempt to ensure its
dominance in foreign-related arbitration cases in China.85
It is less certain whether arbitration clauses calling for “arbitration under UNCITRAL
rules in China” may be enforced.86 One unpublished, internal document of the Supreme
People’s Court (SPC) stated that an arbitration clause of this nature is ad hoc arbitration and
therefore unenforceable.87 On the other hand, arbitration clauses that specify arbitration in
China under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce and the Singapore
International Arbitration Centre are supposedly valid and enforceable.88
It appears that the law in China is shifting towards a more open approach to ad hoc
arbitrations. The December 31, 2003, draft of the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court
Regarding People’s Courts’ Handling of Arbitration Cases Involving Foreign Elements and
Cases Arbitrated Abroad states:
An arbitration agreement is invalid in which the parties have agreed to submit their
disputes to ad hoc arbitration, except when the parties concerned are citizens of
member countries to the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognitions and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the laws of such countries do not
prohibit ad hoc arbitration.
Article 27 (December 31, 2003 draft).89 Since China does not officially allow ad hoc
arbitration, it is assumed that this provision applies only when both parties are citizens of
foreign countries. But some have argued that the SPC provision would only make sense if it
were to apply to the Chinese party as well.90 This could indicate China’s increased
willingness to permit ad hoc arbitrations and enforcement of resulting agreements within
China.91

85

Id.
86 See Clarke, supra note 34, at 8.
87
See Claver-Carone, supra note 35, at 391-92.
88 Id.
89
See Kaplan, supra note XX.
90
Id.
91
Indeed, there are isolated cases where courts in China have upheld ad hoc awards. For example, in 1990 the
Guangzhou Maritime Court enforced three ad hoc awards made in London in Ocean Shipping Company. See John
Shijian Mo, ARBITRATION LAW IN CHINA 427 (Sweet & Maxwell ed. 2001) (discussing Guangzhou v. Marships of
Connecticut).
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C. General procedure for enforcement of arbitration awards in China
Arbitration awards are considered final and enforceable.92 If a party fails to pay an
arbitration award, the party receiving the award must seek enforcement in the court system
where the assets are located. For many parties, this leads to the situation they fear the most:
dealing with the Chinese court system.
1. Chinese court structure
A brief overview of the structure of the court system in China is necessary to understand
the problems of enforcement as well as potential solutions. There are about three thousand
county-level Local People’s Courts.93 Above this are 389 Intermediate Level People’s Courts
(IPC), which sit in provincially-administered cities and centrally-administered cities.94 The
Local and Intermediate Level Courts have separate enforcement chambers. At the next level,
there are thirty High People’s Courts (HPC), one for each province, autonomous region, and
centrally-administered city.95 Finally, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) is the highest court in
China.
In addition, each court has a parallel Adjudication Committee, which is comprised of the
president of the court, the vice-president, the head of specialized chambers, and regular judges.
These Committees, usually members of the CCP, advise individual judges in cases deemed to be
important. This further detracts from judicial independence.
2. Civil Procedure Law
Before 1982, China had no legal basis for enforcing foreign-related arbitral awards.96
The awards depended on voluntary compliance by the losing party.97 The CPL, passed in

92 See Lubman, supra note 10, at 246.
93
See Berkman, supra note XX, at 22.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note 26, at 13.
97
Id.
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1982, provided a legal basis for compulsory enforcement of arbitration awards. Article 195
of the CPL specified:
When one of the parties concerned fails to comply with a ruling made by a
foreign affairs arbitration organization of the PRC, the other party may request
that the ruling be enforced in accordance with the provisions of this article by the
courts at the place where the arbitration organization is located or where the
property is located.
The article did not consider ad hoc awards, and it did not contain a provision for the refusal
of enforcement; all awards were final and enforceable.98 The court would not perform the
limited review allowed under the New York Convention, but was merely instructed to
execute the award. In addition, parties could seek enforcement at the place of arbitration or
where the assets were located.99
The procedure for enforcing foreign arbitral awards under the 1982 CPL proved fairly
confusing. PRC courts could only enforce final judgments or rulings, so arbitral awards must
be converted into a judgment or ruling to be enforceable.100 Moreover, only a foreign court
could request the enforcement of an award, not the victorious party, and some foreign courts
did not have the jurisdiction to make this request.101 The PRC court could also refuse to
enforce the judgment if it would violate national or social interests.102 Due largely to this
confusion, no parties successfully enforced a foreign arbitral award under Article 195.103
In December 1986, the NPC determined that China would join the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).104 China
made the following declaration:
(a) The People’s Republic of China will apply the Convention to the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in the
territory of another Contracting State only on the basis of reciprocity;
and
(b) The People’s Republic of China will apply the Convention only to
disputes which have, according to the laws of the People’s Republic of
98

Id. at 14.
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 15.
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China, been determined as arising out of contractual relationships or
non-contractual commercial legal relationships.
Once China became a party of the New York Convention, it was subject to reciprocity and
commercial reservations.105 Over 100 countries, including most of China’s major trading
partners, are now parties to the New York Convention.106 Reciprocity now applies to nearly
all arbitral awards involving Chinese parties.107
In 1991, the NPC amended the 1982 CPL, specifying the courts must handle
enforcement pursuant to international treaties to which China is a party.108 The revision also
provided standards for refusal to enforce domestic and foreign-related awards, to be
discussed later in the paper. In addition, the revisions no longer provided jurisdiction based
on the place of arbitration.109 The venue for foreign-related awards can only be the
respondent’s legal domicile or where the property is located.110

D. Obstacles to enforcement of foreign arbitration awards
“An arbitral award is only as good as the court that is asked to enforce it.”111
Chinese courts have the statutory authority to enforce arbitral awards. Whether based
on anecdotal information, one or two poorly decided enforcement decisions, or a prevalent
refusal by Chinese courts to enforce foreign awards, many foreign investors and
112

commentators report that enforcement of foreign awards in China is nearly impossible.
105

Id.
Id.
107 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note XX, at 27.
108
See Liu, supra note XX, at 549.
109
See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note XX, at 27.
110 Id.
111
See Michael J. Moser, Roundtable on Arbitration and Conciliation Concerning China: Commentary (paper
prepared for presentation at the 17th ICCA Conference, May 16-18, 2004). Mr. Moser is a partner at Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer.
112 See, e.g., Greg Rushford, Chinese Arbitration: Can It Be Trusted? ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1999;
Harer, supra note 23 (“If the Chinese party to an arbitration agreement does not voluntarily participate and
comply with an award, the arbitration agreement can be a no-win situation for a foreign party transacting
business with a Chinese entity.”); Sally A. Harpole, Following Through on Arbitration, CHINA BUS. REV.,
September-October 1998, at 33-38, available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/9809/harpole.html;
Jerome A. Cohen, “Experience in Arbitration and Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the
P.R.C.” Joint U.S.-China Arbitration Seminar, April 7, 1998, Beijing, China (“Experience in Arbitration”)
(citing the Revpower case and an attempt by a Swiss company to enforce a Stockholm arbitration award).
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Combating this perception, PRC sources have cited to positive anecdotal information to
downplay enforcement challenges.113
The difficulty in verifying the accuracy of these foreign reports is exacerbated by the
lack of concrete measurable data. Several attempts have been made to ascertain the
likelihood of success for enforcing an arbitration award. In 1997, the Arbitration Research
Institute (ARI) of the China Chamber of Commerce surveyed 134 applications made to
People’s Courts between 1991 and 1996 for enforcement of CIETAC awards.114 According
to this survey, 97 awards were enforced and 37 were denied enforcement by the courts.115
The survey cited main reasons for denial of the awards. In several cases, the validity of the
arbitration agreement itself was in question. For other cases, parties were effectively denied
the opportunity to participate in the arbitration proceedings. In yet other cases, the courts
found that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by acting outside the jurisdictional limits
of the arbitration body or the scope of the arbitration agreement.116
Professor Randall Peerenboom claims that the ARI’s survey suffered from
“methodological problems and poor responsiveness by the courts.”117 He conducted his own
independent survey of 89 CIETAC and foreign arbitral award enforcement cases.118
Calculating enforcement rates from 72 of these cases, Peerenboom painted a substantially
bleaker picture than the official CIETAC statistics, finding that 52% of the foreign awards
and 47% of the CIETAC awards were enforced.119 Investors could expect to recover 50-75%
of the award amount in 34% of the cases and half of the award amount in over 40% of the
cases.120

113 See, e.g., Wang Guiguo, “One Country, Two Arbitration Systems: Recognition and Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards in Hong Kong and China,” 14 J. INT’L ARB. 5-42 (Mar. 1997) (claiming there are few reported
cases where courts have refused to enforce a convention award).
114
See Cheng, supra note XX, at 130.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Randall Peerenboom, Seeking Truth From Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the
PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 254 (2001) (“Seeking Truth”).
118 Id. at 251.
119
Id. at 254.
120 Id.
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What accounts for this relatively low recovery rate for arbitration awards? Many
different factors may be involved, including a lack of an independent Chinese judicial
system, corruption, and the insolvency of Chinese parties.

1. Lack of an independent judiciary: Influence from CCP and local
government officials
The Constitution of the PRC, in effect since 1982, specifies that China is a unitary
state based on a system of parliamentary supremacy.121 In practice, however, the Communist
Party (CCP) exercises governance over China parallel to official State governing bodies.122
The CCP Committeealso exerts tremendous influence on all levels of the court system.123
The Committee often selects judges, and the People’s Congress at the corresponding level
ratifies the choices.124 These judges go on to serve on the adjudication committee of each
court, wielding considerable power to determine the outcome of controversial cases.125
Judges who are also CCP members sometimes discuss cases involving difficult legal issues
with the Political-Legal Committee, and accept general policies set by the CCP.126 As a
result, parties affiliated with the CCP rarely lose in the court system.127
Judges in China do not enjoy independent judicial decision-making. Local
governments appoint judges and pay them a low salary, and Chinese judges do not enjoy
tenure.128 The low salaries and financial dependence on the government could increase the
instances of judges accepting bribes or favoring local parties.129 In addition, relatives and
administrative superiors of the judges may influence judicial decision-making.130

121

James V. Feinerman, The Give and Take of Central-Local Relations, CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, January 1, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 10921709.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note 26, at 44.
125
Randall Peerenboom, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 306 (Cambridge University Press 2002)
(“Long March”).
126
Id.
127 See Reinstein, supra note 4.
128 See Lubman, supra note 10, at 279; “Long March,” supra note XX, at 294.
129
See Interview with Zhao Shiyan, supra note XX.
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Corruption has often been cited as a deeply rooted problem in the Chinese court
system. One judge reported that she refused a large number of bribes and banquet
invitations, and as a result, “she was ridiculed by her neighbors, treated coldly by her friends
and was even the object of revenge and abuse by scoundrels, but in the end she won the trust
and praise of the masses.”131
Courts in China have less power than their western counterparts, partly due to the
current constitutional structure. Judges are appointed by the NPC and are funded by the
government at the same level.132 The judges rely on salaries and housing provided by the
municipal government.133 This dependence can give local governments leverage over the
courts, and government officials have been known to make threats such as cutting off needed
funding to build housing for court staff. 134 Local courts might “choose” to protect the
defendant business or government to safeguard the local financial needs of the courts or the
local government.135
Courts are also more dependent on local government due to the gradually
decentralization that has taken place since 1985.136 Local governments must often support
themselves through local taxes, fees and charges collected from local businesses, providing
an incentive to propagate those steady sources of income.137 The enforcement of an
arbitration award against a local business could thus negatively impact the local economy,
and in some cases the business will have to shut down, resulting in a number of citizens
losing their jobs and housing.138 Local People’s Courts recognize these detrimental effects
and may seek to evade enforcement of the award.139
131 See Lubman, supra note XX, at 279.
132
Id. at 278.
133
Id.
134 Id.
135 CECILIA HÅKANSSON, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION UNDER CHINESE LAW, Iustus Förlag, 1999.
136
See Pitman B. Potter, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 465, 472-73 (2004). Potter notes this interplay of central and subnational governments resembles the
federalist system of the United States. Id.
137
[Potter article? Find it!]
138
139

See Potter, supra note XX, at 17-18. But Peerenboom’s study challenges the theory of higher enforcement in
more sophisticated areas, as he found more instances of local protectionism in major investment centers than in
smaller cities. See “Seeking Truth,” supra note XX, at 269.
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Decentralization has also affected the various levels of sophistication found within
the local court systems. Provinces develop and adopt new regulations promulgated by the
central government at different speeds, influencing the chances of effectuating enforcement
of an award. Wang Chenguang, Dean of Tsinghua University and a member of the Advisory
Committee to the Supreme People’s Court, notes that the court systems in the coastal areas
are more highly developed, as lawyers trained in those areas tend to stay to work, raising the
level of education for judges and lawyers involved in the system, and there is typically more
interaction with foreign parties.140 On the other hand, rural areas often suffer a high attrition
rate, as many students move to the big cities to pursue a higher education, leading to a court
system ill-prepared to handle conflicts with foreigners.141 But the PRC constitution provides
that China is a unitary state, and the Chinese government continues to subject local
authorities to the central government.142

2. Local protectionism
Local protectionism has long been a dilemma in China. In an effort to fight
protectionism, imperial China required its magistrates to rotate to new places every few years
and prohibited them from serving in their home districts.143 Even the Chinese government
has acknowledged that protection from local officials and courts thwarts the collection of
foreign awards and ultimately interferes with China’s economic development.144
Local protectionism can appear at any stage in the judicial process, and it affects both
foreign parties and parties from foreign provinces in China. Judges have required applicants
for enforcement of an arbitral award to provide a number of documents not required by PRC
law, including evidentiary documents that the arbitration tribunal relied on in making its

140

See Interview with Wang Chenguang, supra note XX.
Id. Indeed, Dean Wang indicates the Supreme People’s Court is considering whether to effectuate simpler court
procedures in outlying areas to make the systems more accessible to the public and easier to use.
142
Id.
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See “US-China Commission Hearing,” supra note XX.
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Potter, supra note XX, at n.72 (citing various Chinese governmental officials decrying local protectionism).
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award.145 Judges have also required parties to perform the costly and time-consuming effort
of translating, notarizing, and consularizing the documents. 146
In one form of protectionism, local governments may help companies to hide or
transfer assets or dodge debts.147 This appears to have taken place in the infamous
RevPower case, where RevPower Limited received a $9 million arbitral award from the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce against a Chinese party. But when RevPower attempted
to enforce the award in the Shanghai People’s Court, the court refused to acknowledge the
award for two years, during which time the Chinese party had transferred its business and
assets to its parent and grandparent companies and appeared to be insolvent.148
Chinese authorities recognize that local protectionism adversely affects long-term
business dealings with foreign companies. One Chinese report stated, “The hard-won respect
of CIETAC is being squandered by a judicial system unable to make Chinese parties pay
up.”149 In 1991, the President of the SPC, Ren Jianxian, acknowledged to the NPC the
damage caused by local protectionism. He urged several prohibitions to counter local
protectionism:
(i) Prohibiting local party cadres from interfering with the judicial
process in an attempt to protect local interests;
(ii) Prohibiting government officials and other parties from making
threats or launching campaigns against judicial officers carrying
out the execution of court orders;
(iii)Prohibiting judicial organs from practicing favoritism towards
local parties by making unfair rulings or avoiding their proper
responsibilities;
(iv)Prohibiting officials of the public security and procuratorial organs
from interfering with the adjudication of economic cases by
treating contract and debts
(v) Prohibiting any organ or individual from obstructing the execution
orders of the People’s Courts in any other way.150
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See “Seeking Truth,” supra note XX, at 299.
146 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note XX, at 88; Potter at 19.
147 See id. at 194.
148 See Brown, supra note 23, at 341; “Seeking Truth,” supra note XX, at n.5.
149 See Lubman, supra note 13, at 157; see also DEJUN CHENG, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Butterworths Asia, 2000.
150 See Cheng, supra note 55, at 128.
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Justice Ren urged that court personnel and government officials who repeatedly violate these
prohibitions and engage in local protectionism be disciplined and possibly subject to criminal
sanctions.
While the SPC has responded to the threat of local protectionism, as discussed later in
this paper, it is uncertain whether these efforts have had an effect. The web site for the
Beijing Arbitration Commission contains an interesting editorial note concerning the
continuing threat of local protectionism, in relation to Chinese parties from outlying
provinces. The editor writes:
When I attended an international convention, hearing other countries talk about the
severe regional protectionism of China Mainland justice, a so-called national selfrespect made me hardly admitted I had heard about willing and promptly even though
I [] believed it to be absolutely unreasonable and irresponsible. Upon reading the
following cases however, I was dropped into such agony that [the] ghost of the
regional protectionism were broadening its magic trance around Chinese great
ground.151
The situation is certainly alive and well, and remains to be fully addressed.

3. Transfer of assets and resulting insolvency of Chinese party
a. Assistance of courts, officials
Peerenboom disagrees with critics who blame local protectionism for the lack of
enforcement of awards, and instead claims local protectionism has served as a “scapegoat”
for judges, central government officials and lawyers, where blame for failure to enforce the
award is shifted to local government officials.152 Peerenboom arguesthattrue challenge to
enforcing an arbitration award is the insolvency of the respondent.153 Of the 37 nonenforcement cases in his 1997 survey, 43% were unenforceable because the respondent did
not have the necessary assets to pay the award.154 In eleven of the sixteen no-asset non-
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See “Civil Ruling of Shanxi Jiexiu People’s Court against Enforcement of NO.199801276 Arbitration Award of
Beijing Arbitration Commission,” at http://www.bjac.org.cn/en/brow.asp?id=145.
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See “Seeking Truth,” supra note XX, at 254.
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enforcement cases, local counsel for the petitioners believed that the respondents were truly
insolvent and lacked unencumbered assets.155 In three other cases, the lawyers believed the
respondents had fraudulent transferred their assets to other companies to avoid payment. The
lawyers in the remaining two cases were unsure whether the respondent had assets.156
While Peerenboom downplays the role of local protectionism in the enforcement of
awards, many cases of apparent insolvency could be a result of protectionism. For example,
a local government official could warn a company of an upcoming application for
enforcement, leading to a fraudulent transfer. Or a bank might aid the local party by delaying
or refusing to provide bank account information or freeze bank accounts.
If the property has been transferred or is no longer available, the plaintiff might need
to bring a second suit to seize property to satisfy the award. For example, Dean Wang served
as chief arbitrator in a case in Shenzhen.157 Wang later spoke with the attorney of the
winning party who said the enforcement was taking a long time because the other party had
declared bankruptcy.158 As a result, the attorney had to file another lawsuit to seize property
in order to satisfy the award.159
An additional lawsuit was also necessary in the case Guangzhou Ocean Shipping
Company, in which the defendant American company failed to pay the remainder of an
arbitration award.160 The plaintiff Chinese company learned that a third party, located in
China, owed the defendant a freight fee and was preparing to pay the fee.161 The plaintiff
submitted an application for recognition of the arbitral award and for a transfer of the above
payment to the plaintiff to satisfy that award. The Guangzhou Maritime Court ordered the
fee to be paid directly to the plaintiff.162
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b. Applicants have the responsibility to locate respondents’ assets for collection
In order to attach assets, courts must ascertain where the assets are located.
Respondents are required by law to state where the location of their assets, yet in practice,
parties seeking enforcement bear the burden of providing this information to the courts.163
Judges may decline to track down the assets for several reasons. They frequently have
difficulty obtaining cooperation from banks and administrative agencies, due mainly to the
low stature of the courts within the political structure. Banks may resist court orders to assist
in enforcement because “the court is essentially just another bureaucracy, with no more
power to tell [them] what to do than the Post Office.”164
In the face of frequent mergers, reorganizations and spin-off companies, China’s
rapidly changing economic landscape makes it difficult to determine asset ownership.165
Inadequately documented transfers and mergers of various companies, plus a rapidlychanging regulatory framework for land acquisition in China, add difficulty to find clear title
to many assets.166
With the burden on the applicant, information regarding the respondent’s assets is
even harder to obtain. Parties may have to work with professional investigation companies,
whose members in turn rely on connections with former ministry colleagues to find
information on assets.167 Under PRC law, Chinese companies are limited to one bank
account for normal business activities,168 yet some companies ignore this law and open
multiple accounts to evade taxes. It is often almost impossible to track down all of a
company’s accounts.169
Applicants seeking information on a respondent’s assets may contact the
Administration of Industry and Commerce (AIC). The AIC compiles a Registration Record

163 See Enforcement Regulation art. 28; “Seeking Truth,” supra note XX, at 294.
164 Id.
165 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note 26, at XX.
166
Id.
167 See “Seeking Truth,” supra note 47, at 292.
168 See Commercial Banking Law of the PRC art. 48.
169 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note 26, at 49.
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Book, in which all companies’ financial statements should be available.170 These records are
officially available to the public, but in practice they are closely guarded, and lawyers usually
need to present a court notice before being granted access to the record books.171
Banks, for the most part, are reluctant to give out account information out of fear of
damaging relations with their customers.172 Instead of immediately complying with a court
order, banks might notify customers first to allow sufficient time for the customer to transfer
money into another account before the bank attempts attachment.173

4. Ambiguity in the CPL regarding grounds for refusal of enforcement
Article 260 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (for Trial
Implementation) (CPL) provides specific procedural grounds for refusing to enforce foreignrelated awards:
(a) The parties have neither included an arbitration clause in their contract
or subsequently reached a written agreement;
(b) The respondent did not receive notification to appoint an arbitrator or
to take part in the arbitration proceedings or the respondent could not
state his opinions due to reasons for which he is not responsible;
(c) The formation of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration proceedings
do not conform to the rules of arbitration;
(d) The matter decided in the award exceeds the scope of the arbitration
agreement or is beyond the authority of the arbitration institution.
Finally, a court may refuse to enforce an award if the enforcement is contrary to social public
interests.
This final basis of refusal, where enforcement is contrary to the “social and public
interests of China, could be problematic.174 In the famous case Dongfeng Garments Factory
v. Henan Garments Import & Export Co., plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had breached

170 Id.
171 Id.
172
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173 See id. See also Simon Morgan, “Options and Practicalities,” Dispute Resolution in China and Hong Kong
Seminar, May 30-31, 1996, London, England.
174 See Håkansson, supra note 51, at 203.
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the parties’ joint venture contract.175 A CIETAC arbitral tribunal accepted the case in April
1991 and awarded considerable damages to the plaintiffs in April 1992. The defendants did
not pay the damages, so the plaintiffs commenced proceedings in an Intermediate People’s
Court (IPC) for enforcement of the award. The court issued an order rejecting the plaintiffs’
application.176 The court held that “according to current State policies and regulations,
enforcement . . . would seriously harm the economic influence of the State and public interest
of the society, and adversely affect the foreign trade order of the State.” To compel the
defendant to pay damages for its breach would disadvantage “social and public interests.”177
The SPC subsequently overturned the lower court’s decision in November 1992,
holding, “It is incorrect for the Zhengzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court to refuse
to enforce the arbitral award on the grounds that enforcement would seriously harm the
economic interests of the state…”178

5. Lack of court funds
Court personnel must often travel to non-performing party’s local court to coordinate
enforcement efforts, and lacking funds to do so, they sometimes ask foreign parties to cover
travel costs. But many foreign parties would be punished in their home country if they were
to comply with this request. American parties, for example, might be punished under United
States law relating to corrupt overseas business practices if they give money to court
personnel.179 But if the parties refuse to comply, the court might delay or refuse to enforce
the award.180

6. Shortage of qualified, experienced judges

175 See id.
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178 See Cheng, supra note 55, at 131.
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While there are over 200,000 judges in China, most of these judges are not university
graduates in law.181 Many have instead come to the courts after serving in the military or for
Party organizations.182 As of 1993, only two-thirds of all judges had post-secondary training
in any subject, including non-legal subjects.183 Furthermore, many young judges have been
appointed to handle the recent judicial reforms, but they often lack the expertise required to
effectuate the reforms.184 This lack of legal expertise has resulted in a mishandling of
applications for enforcement of arbitration awards.185
In addition, enforcement is considered the least prestigious chamber for judges. As a
result, the judges assigned to the enforcement chamber usually have less training than judges
of other chambers.186 Chinese judges may mistakenly apply PRC law to interpret the validity
of an arbitration agreement, as happened in the Revpower case.187
Low salaries have exacerbated the shortage of skilled judges in China. Some of the
highest-paid judges receive only RMB 2,000-3,000 Yuan/month (approx. USD 250350/month), whereas lawyers in China may earn RMB 10,000-30,000 Yuan/month (USD
1200-3600/month),188 so judges often abandon their post for the “greener pastures” of
starting their own practice or joining large firms.189 One SPC judge commented that in 19981999 alone, approximately 15% of all People’s Court judges left their positions for positions
in law firms.190

7. Failure to sanction noncompliant parties

181 Susan Finder, Inside the People’s Courts: China’s Litigation System and The Resolution of Commercial
Disputes, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE PRC: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION IN
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182
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Chinese courts have a range of contempt powers to sanction those who fail to comply
with the terms of a court order or obstruct the enforcement process.191 On August 23, 2002,
the People’s Congress adopted a law interpretation imposing criminal sanctions on parties
which attempt to evade enforcement of court judgments and arbitral awards.192 In addition,
Article 102 of the CPL prohibits forging or destroying important evidence; concealing,
transferring, selling or destroying property that has been sealed up or detained; and refusing
to carry out legally effective judgments or orders of the people’s court.193 Under Article
102, courts may impose fines between RMB 1000 and 30,000 on non-compliant companies
and impose punitive damages in the amount of twice the interest from the time of default.194
In addition to financial sanctions, courts may detain respondents for refusing to
comply with subpoenas. Article 313 of the Criminal Law195 gives courts the ability to
impose a sentence of less than three years on parties which seek to conceal, transfer, or
intentionally destroy property, as well as voluntarily convey property or transfer property at
an unreasonably low price, making the judgment or award unenforceable.196 Under Article
221 of the Civil Procedure Law, courts may freeze or transfer the bank deposits of the losing
party, as well as make inquiries to banks or other financial institutions.197 And courtsmay
withhold or garnish wages or evict a respondent from his home, under Article 222 of the
CPL.198
With this wide array of sanction possibilities, one might expect Chinese courts to
effectively control non-compliance.199 But the measures are not often utilized, and have

191 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note 26, at 51.
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Wang Sheng Chang, Roundtable on Arbitration and Conciliation Concerning China: CIETAC’s Perspective
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sometimes proven ineffective.200 According to Judge Lu Xiaolong of the Supreme People’s
Court, the SPC has never sanctioned non-compliant parties for not paying a damages award
and has never held a non-compliant party in contempt of court.201
[DISCUSS REASONS FOR NO SANCTIONS WITH JUDGE LU!] Local
government officials may instruct managers of the respondent company to not comply with
the court’s orders. Because of the low stature of Chinese courts and lack of respect for the
rule of law, judges fear their imposed fines or detention of non-complying officials will not
be carried out.202
Courts might instead take creative extra-judicial measures to effect compliance.
Some courts have had the name of a non-complying company published in the local
newspaper.203 This effectively put pressure on the defaulting company to pay up while
providing notice to other companies of the defaulting company’s potentially poor economic
condition.204

8. Lack of transparency in judicial process
Parties often have difficulty determining what actually happened during the
enforcement proceedings, as they do not have a right to participate in hearings where higher
courts decide whether or not to enforce an arbitration award.205 The higher court need not
notify the parties about the hearing or give them an opportunity to submit written documents
to support their positions.206 Some parties have complained that the higher court’s reliance
on the lower court’s presentation of the facts and legal issues had disadvantaged them.207

200 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note XX, at 53.
201
E-mail from Judge Lu, supra note XX.
202 See id.
203 See id. at 54.
204
Chinese law practitioners appear well-versed in using all resources, not just legal ones. As one Chinese attorney
put it, one needs to “think of a problem in a less legal way!” Interview with Zhao Shiyan, supra at XX.
205 See “Seeking Truth,” supra note 47, at 288.
206

207 See id.
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Furthermore, the Enforcement Regulation does not require that the court state its reason for
its decision, nor state the grounds for deciding to extend the allotted time for enforcement.208
[Add paragraph on how greater accountability could be useful, reassuring to investors.]
E. What steps has China taken to ensure enforcement?
Considering the newness of the legal system and arbitration commissions in China, as
well as the constitutional obstacles facing courts, Chinese officials and judges are attempting
to change the current system to better enforce arbitration awards and allow foreign investors
to feel safe in their business transactions. This section will analyze recent developments in
award enforcement.

1. Party members and government officials are speaking up
The Chinese government recognizes the importance of attracting foreign
investment.209 They are aware of adverse effects of negative publicity resulting from cases
such as Revpower. As a result, the government has passed several laws that provide foreign
investors benefits and protection not given to domestic companies.210 The CCP has
supported government efforts to combat local protectionism through campaigns such as
designating 1999 to be the Year of Enforcement. 211 The CCP is not supposed to interfere
with courts to influence the outcome of cases. Nevertheless, judges (often CCP members)
continue to discuss specific cases with the CCP Political-Legal Committee. Furthermore, the
“flurry of rule-making” by the Supreme People’s Court, described below, can be seen as
“testimony to the resolve of the Chinese Government to come to grips with this important
matter.”212

208 See id.
209 See “Seeking Truth,” supra note 47, at 279.
210

211 One source stated that the Year of Enforcement was actually proposed by the SPC, but embraced by
government officials. See Claver-Carone, supra note 35, at fn 157; “Seeking Truth,” supra note XX, at 285.
212
See Moser, supra note XX.
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Indeed, Peerenboom found that Party interference did not affect enforcement of
arbitral awards.213 He had only found one case where a Party member blocked the
enforcement of an arbitral award, and he reported that most lawyers surveyed felt that the
CCP played a positive role in award enforcement.214 Senior leaders attempting to attract
foreign investment do not want the negative publicity that results from awards that are not
enforced. Peerenboom cited three cases where a senior member of the CCP Committee or
Political-Legal Committee helped to secure enforcement.215
The bigger tension in China may arise between political and legal reform.216 Due to
the authoritarian nature of a one-party regime, the Chinese government might feel that it
cannot afford to lose cases. The government wants freedom of contract, yet it has not
indicated its willingness to lose some cases and subject itself to the legal system.217 But
without surrendering control over court decisions, it will be very difficult “to create a market
economy that will inspire the confidence of foreign financial investors.”218

2. Statutory interpretations passed by the SPC
Neither the Arbitration Law nor the Civil Procedure Law contains procedural rules for
enforcing arbitral awards or challenging the validity of arbitration agreements.219 These issues
are instead addressed in several dozen judicial notices.220 The most important of these notices
are discussed below.
a. 1995 SPC Reporting Mechanism Notice

213 See id. at 285-86.
214
Id.
215 See id.
216 See Reinstein, supra note 4.
217 See id.
218
See “US-China Commission Hearing,” supra note XX.
219
See Moser, supra note XX.
220
Id. See also Lu Xiaolong, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award in China (May 18,
2004), in 17th ICCA Conference, May 16-18, 2004.
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In 1995, the SPC issued the Notice on Courts’ Handling of Issues in Relation to
Matters of Foreign-Related Arbitration and Foreign Arbitration (1995 Notice).221 The
Notice specifies that, if an IPC intends to refuse to recognize or enforce a foreign award, it
must first submit a report to High People’s Court (HPC). If the HPC agrees with the IPC, the
HPC must then report the case to the SPC.222 The SPC has a special tribunal to review these
cases, which include review of the validity of arbitral clauses or agreements and resulting
awards in both domestic foreign-related awards.223
The SPC generally reviews about 30 cases every year, although in 2004 it reviewed
over 40 cases.224 These cases result in both enforcement of the award or refusal to enforce.225
Supreme People’s Court Judge Zhang Jin Xian related to the author two recent examples of
SPC review under the reporting mechanism.226 In one case, the London Sugar Association
sought to have an arbitral award enforced against the China Sugar & Wine Group Company
before the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court.227 In a decree issued on August 6,
2001, the court refused to recognize and enforce the award, stating the award ran counter to
public policy in China. On appeal, the Beijing High People’s Court affirmed this decision,
and the case was then reviewed by the Supreme People’s Court. In a decision on July 1,
2003, the SPC recognized and enforced the award, holding that, while the transaction leading
to the award was invalid according to Chinese law, the action was not equal to violating the
public policy of China.
In another recent case, the London Arbitration Tribunal granted an award on
December 7, 2001 for contract violation against Wuhu Smeltery, Anhui, China, on behalf of
Gerald Metals Inc. (GMI).228 GMI sought to have the award before the Anhui Province
Higher People’s Court, but the court found that the award went beyond the scope of the
221 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note XX, at 28.
222
See Cheng, supra note XX, at 128.
223
E-mail from Dr. Lu Xiaolong, Judge, Supreme People’s Court, China (Jan. 19, 2005, 08:41 PST) (on file with
author). Dr. Xiolong is the head of the SPC tribunal which reviews cases referred by the reporting mechanism. Id.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
E-mail from Zhang Jin Xian, Judge, Supreme People’s Court, China (Jan. 25, 2005, 04-36 PST) (on file with
author).
227
Id.
228
Id.
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arbitration clause included in the contract, and it refused to recognize the entire award. On
review, the SPC affirmed that the award went beyond the scope of the arbitration clause, but
found that the award could be separated into two parts: the section with the right to arbitrate
and the section not under arbitration. The SPC concluded that part of the award arose from
the arbitrable section of the contract, and it recognized that portion of the award.229
b. Interim preservation of assets and evidence
To prevent funds from being transferred and making the award unenforceable, a party
may apply to the arbitration commission for preservation of the other party’s assets. The
arbitration commission must then file these papers with the People’s Court, as per Article 28
of the Arbitration Law.230 A party can also move for property preservation under Article 258
of the Civil Procedure Law.231 The People’s Court then rules on the request for interim
intervention. 232
While these articles certainly indicate a willingness by the court system to preserve
property, these methods may fail for the same reasons discussed above, that the same local
court ruling on the interim request could have already facilitated local protectionism. Again,
the local court may fear that enforcement might interfere with the defendant’s ability to
operate a company, or it might cave in under pressure from local governments and deny the
application.

c. 1998 regulation clarifying arbitration fees and establishing time
limitations
In 1998, the SPC issued the Regulations of the SPC Regarding the Issues of Fees and
Investigation Periods for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(Regulations).233 These Regulations clarified the collection of fees for actions to enforce
229

Id.
E-mail from Cao Lijun, Arbitrator and Staff Member of CIETAC, Beijing, China (Dec. 10, 2004, 02:04 PST) (on
file with author) (“Cao Lijun e-mail 12/10/04”).
231
Id.
232 See Håkansson, supra note 51, at 144.
233 See Cheng, supra note 55, at 137.
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foreign arbitral awards, and also suggested time limitations within which courts should
resolve such actions.234 The Regulations apply nationwide, specifying that the People’s
Courts may collect an application fee for each action in the amount of 500 Yuan.235 In
addition, the court may require that the party applying for enforcement of an arbitral award
must pay in advance an enforcement fee to be determined in accordance with the fee scale
contained in the Measures Regarding Costs for People’s Court Actions promulgated in
1989.236 The Regulations thus prohibited the common practice of “double collection” where
People’s Courts charged parties separately for recognition and enforcement procedures.237
The Regulations also addressed the “judicial purgatory” in handling applications for
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.238 Under the Regulations, the
People’s Court must issue its ruling within two months from the date of accepting the
application.239 Then the court must complete the enforcement proceedings within six months
after the ruling granting recognition to the award.240 If the court refuses recognition or
enforcement, it must report to the SPC within two months from the date it accepted the
application.241

d. 1998 education rectification campaign
Xiao Yang, the President of the SPC, reportedly confirmed comments by President
Jiang Zemin that law enforcement officials have participated in such wrong as “eating free
meals, taking without paying, imposing man-made barriers and soliciting favors, demanding
and taking bribes, perverting justice for money, and bullying the common people.”242 In
response, Chinese officials in 1998 ordered an “educational rectification campaign” that
234 See id.
235
Id.
236 See id.
237 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note XX, at 22.
238 See Cheng, supra note 55, at 137.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241 See id.
242
Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and
Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 264 n.369 (2001).
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denounced these activities and focused on reducing judicial corruption, incompetence and
inefficiency. As a result, among other things, 8,110 previously mishandled cases were
corrected, and nearly 5000 judges and prosecutors were disciplined.243

e. 2002 and 2003 SPC regulations limiting jurisdiction over arbitration
awards with foreign elements to specialized IPC courts

On March 1, 2002, the SPC issued a directive stating that all civil and commercial cases
involving foreign elements are under the jurisdiction of certain IPCs in capital cities of provinces
and special economic zones.244 This provision was handed down with the intent to lessen the
potential local protectionism of local courts, particularly protectionism aimed at foreign
parties.245 The SPC also intended to increase the quality of judgment by focusing foreignelement cases in courts with highly-educated and experienced judges.246
It is too soon to say whether this interpretation has reduced the local protectionism faced
by foreign parties, both from other provinces and from other countries. SPC Judge Zhang
believes that the interpretation has improved the Chinese legal environment. As an example, he
cites to the Intermediate People’s Courts in Guangdong province, which from 2002 to 2004 tried
10 cases between foreign parties and local governments. Judge Zhang claims that, due to the
2002 interpretation, the local government defendants were discouraged from interfering in the
judicial process. As a result, the cases were decided fairly, as none of the parties decided to
appeal the decisions.247

f. SPC regulation imposing liability for failure to enforce awards

243 Id.
244
See Xiaolong, supra note 220. The SPC solidified this rule in its Dec. 31, 2003 provisions.
245
See Zhang e-mail, supra note XX; Moser, supra note XX.
246
See Moser, supra note XX
247
See Zhang e-mail, supra note XX.
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The SPC issued two regulations in 2000 to clarify jurisdictional issues and increase
the sense of responsibility among enforcement personnel.248 The regulations imposed
liability for failure to enforce judgments and awards in accordance with the law.249 The
likelihood of judges to use these regulations remains to be seen, however, particularly given
the current lack of sanctions employed by the courts.

3. 1995 Judges Law
China now requires a basic standard of education for its judges. The 1995 Judges Law
specifies that judges must be graduates of tertiary educational institutions in law or have
specialized legal knowledge.250 Judges appointed before the implementation of the Judges Law
who do not meet these standards must attend a “Judges College” to study law part-time.251 The
SPC has trained HPC judges at the National Judges Institute, and those judge are responsible for
training other judges.252 The SPC has provided specific training for judges on enforcement.253.
4. Changes in CIETAC arbitration rules
CIETAC made a series of major changes to its arbitration rules in 1994, 1995 and
1998 in order to reflect fairness and objectivity to the international business community.254
CIETAC now permits foreign arbitrators to be included in the Panel of Arbitrators.255
Arbitration can be carried out in English or other foreign languages as agreed upon by the
parties involved,256 and foreign parties can use their own non-Chinese attorneys in the
proceedings.257 The new arbitration rules set forth a nine-month time limit for a tribunal to
248 See “Evolving Regulatory Framework,” supra note 26, at 17.
249 See id.
250 See Finder, supra note 78, at 68.
251
Id.
252
See “Long March,” supra note XX, at 293.
253
For example, the SPC gathered all of the country’s judges in 1996 for a conference on enforcement. See Finder,
supra note XX.
254 See Ge, supra note 1, at 132. See also Lubman, supra note 13, at 165.
255 Arbitration Rules of CIETAC art. 10.
256 See id. art. 75.
257 See id. art. 22.
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conduct a hearing and render its award, and a time extension may be granted.258 Arbitral
awards are final and binding upon both disputing parties, and neither party may bring suit
before a court or request alteration of the award from any other organization.259
The revised CIETAC rules now provide for new “fast-track” arbitration tribunals. In
the “fast track,” a single arbitrator appointed by the CIETAC chairman handles claims worth
less than RMB 500,000 Yuan (USD 60,000).260 Under these proceedings, oral hearings need
not take place.261 The panel must render an award within ninety days from the appointment
of the arbitrator or within thirty days from conclusion of an oral hearing.262 This type of
tribunal particularly benefits parties with smaller claims and with time constraints.

F. Further suggestions to assist enforcement of Chinese arbitration awards
It is not yet clear whether the newly-promulgated SPC rules are having much impact on the
enforcement of awards. Professor Jerome Cohen describes these measures as “bandaids for a
patient that is severely ill,” while the system needs “radical surgery and structural
rehabilitation.”263 It is true that band-aids are easier to apply in China than larger, overarching
structural transformations.264 After all, China does not take quickly to changes, especially those
changes that might threaten the primacy of the CCP. But a combination of several additional
“quick fixes” and deeper structural changes should help modify the current system and reassure
foreign investors that they can ultimately achieve a happy ending in China.
1. Publish comprehensive statistics on enforcement
Scholars and practitioners have urged the Chinese government to make Chinese
arbitration more public and transparent. As a result, two volumes have been published
258 See id. arts. 22 and 52.
259 See id. art. 60.
260
See Ge, supra note 1, at 133.
261
Id.
262 Id.
263
Jerome Cohen, Opening Statement Before the First Public Hearing of the U.S.-China Commission, June 14, 2001
hearing, Washington, D.C., available at
http://www.uscc.gov/hearing/2001_02hearings/transcripts/01_06_14tran.pdf (“US-China Commission Hearing”).
264
See Interview with Wang Chenguang, supra note XX.
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containing written CIETAC awards.265 These volumes help to add transparency to the
CIETAC process. In addition, Cheng Dejun and Wang Sheng Chang, both Vice Chairmen of
CIETAC, and Michael Moser, a CIETAC arbitrator, published various case summaries in
their recent volume “International Arbitration in the People’s Republic of China:
Commentary, Cases and Materials” (2nd ed. 2000).
While these publications are useful in introducing practitioners to CIETAC
practices,266 their helpfulness in determining the reasoning behind CIETAC awards and
whether the awards are enforced is questionable. The awards often fail to state the applicable
legal rules, and focusing more on the fairness or equity of the awards than on the rules
themselves.267 The fact-specific awards thus offer little guidance to lawyers seeking to
determine the reasoning behind CIETAC awards.268
But arbitration bodies such as CIETAC are in advantageous positions to determine
whether their foreign-related awards are enforced by the court system. Through postarbitration questionnaires and some research, for example, CIETAC could compile a
database of the awards, their enforcement rates and the reasons for non-enforcement. At
least one CIETAC official has recognized the importance of such statistics and has indicated
CIETAC’s willingness to conduct these types of surveys in the near future.269

2. Continue to improve the education of Chinese judges
As discussed earlier, many Chinese judges do not have a background in law, and most
have never studied foreign legal systems. The fledgling court system, low political stature

265 See Leung, supra note 27, PATRICIA LEUNG, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, SELECTED WORKS OF CHINA
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION AWARDS (1989-1995) UPDATED TO 1997,
Sweet & Maxwell, 1998.
266 See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 55.
267 See Lubman, supra note 13. This may reflect the Chinese tendency to focus more on the solution of the
dispute, the fairness of the solution and the factual situation than to the legal arguments presented by the parties.
Id.
268 See Lubman, supra note 10, at 290.
See Lijun Cao e-mail 12/10/04, supra note XX.
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and lack of historical precedents make it difficult for judges to know and follow the rule of
law.
One recent development may serve to strengthen the rule of law in China. In 1999,
Temple University School of Law collaborated with Tsinghua University in Beijing to begin
the first foreign LL.M. degree program in China.270 As of November 2004, 141 lawyers and
judges have already graduated from this program. This 15-month, 30 credit program
includes a summer semester at Temple’s campus in Philadelphia, PA.271 Combined with
several other legal programs in China, Temple has educated 411 legal professionals within
just four years.272
After four years of running the only Western LL.M. in China, Temple is now being
joined by several other Western-style law programs. The University of Minnesota Law
School is currently planning an LL.M. program beginning in Summer 2005, in collaboration
with China University of Political Science and Law (“Fada”) in Beijing. In the program,
Chinese lawyers will earn 24 credits in the 18-month program, which will be taught in
English by the U of M faculty.273 In addition, in February 2004, Peking University Law
School and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at Lund
University in Sweden launched a three-semester Masters’ program for Research Direction in
Human Rights.274 Twenty postgraduate students from Peking University are enrolled in this
groundbreaking program.275
Several other programs in specialized legal areas have also begun in China. The
University of Maryland and Tianjin University are offering a Mastersdegree in Judicial
270 See id.
271
Interview with John Smagula, Director of Asia Law Programs, Temple University School of Law, in Beijing,
China (Nov. 2, 2004).
272 Temple’s other programs include a judicial education partnership with the Supreme People’s Court, a
prosecutorial education partnership with the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, legislative drafting projects,
scholarly roundtables promoting the development of law, and AIDS and public health law initiatives. Id.
273
Interview with Adelaide Ferguson, Assistant Dean for Post J.D. Programs, Temple University School of Law, in
Beijing, China (Nov. 6, 2004); Mary Jane Smetanka, “U and China: A shared passion for education,”
startribune.com, at http://www.startribune.com/stories/1592/5119861.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2004); E-mail from
Meredith M. McQuaid, Associate Dean and Director of International and Graduate Programs, University of
Minnessota School of Law (Dec. 15, 2004, 14:33 PST) (on file with author)..
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Justice, while the University of Australia is collaborating with Normal University in
Shanghai to offer a Masters degree in International Business Transactions.276 And Chinese
judges and lawyers have increasingly been permitted to study abroad.277
3. Develop a special judicial division for enforcement of foreign-related awards

While the SPC has already taken steps to ensure a judge’s expertise in the field, namely
assigning foreign-related arbitration enforcement cases to specifically designated IPCs, the
development of separate divisions specializing in enforcement of foreign-related awards would
further help ensure judges’ expertise and lessening of local protectionism. This approach is
already being tested in the intellectual property realm, as special courts dedicated to intellectual
property matters were established in July 1993 as divisions of the Beijing HPC and IPC.278
Judicial personnel in these divisions receive specialized training to improve their ability to
handle difficult cases.279
In a similar manner, China could develop specialized enforcement branches aimed solely
at arbitration awards. This would ensure a high level of specialization within the divisions, and
would reassure foreign investors concerned about fairness and expertise.280 [Write this bit…]
Use Neil Kaplan’s article from ICCA conference, p. 16; also use Berkman article p. 10.
4. Hire a skilled local attorney to help develop “guanxi” relationships with local
officials
276

Interview with Mo Zhang, professor, Temple University School of Law, in Beijing, China (November 1, 2004).
For example, Temple Law School reports 20 LL.M. Chinese graduates from their main campus in Philadelphia.
Johan Gernandt, Vice Chairman of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, reports that
several Chinese lawyers have studied or practiced in Stockholm, Sweden during the last ten years. [GET THE
CITE!!]
Furthermore, in 1997, the solicitor-general of Hong Kong, Daniel Fung, announced the establishment of a
model court in mainland China funded by the Hong Kong government, where judges and attorneys from Hong Kong
would stage mock trials for observation by Chinese lawyers, judges and officials. See Interview by Kirsten
Sylvester with Daniel Fung, solicitor-general of Hong Kong, Washington, D.C. (1997), available at 1998 WL
10921709.
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Attorney Zhao Shiyan notes that most of the barriers in enforcement are practical, not
legal.281 Accordingly, he suggests that foreign investors make good connections with local
governments and banks. If a conflict arises, Zhao suggests the foreign party should hire a
competent local attorney, sit down with bank officials (or the potentially troubling party) and
talk through the problem amicably.282 Spoken like a true Confucianist, Zhao suggests
arbitration proceedings should be avoided if at all possible, and the problems should be
addressed through relationships.283
5. Persevere
One American academic has “diagnosed” many foreigners with “forensic
xenophobia,” unwilling to use the Chinese legal system.284 But he argues that foreigners
should push through these “fears” and continue to use the court system. By doing this,
procedural obstacles and weaknesses in the legal code will be uncovered, continuing to alert
the Chinese government of the need for further reforms. And the existence of only several
notorious cases (such as Revpower) will likely discourage local officials from utilizing
protectionist methods.

CONCLUSION
China’s arbitration system is a fascinating case study in the recent development of a
judicial system constrained by severe social and economic factors. Foreign investors desire a
guaranteed return on their investment, yet social and political factors discussed in this paper
both encourage and thwart that certainty. Additional political pressure from other world
powers may further shape China’s legal system. For example, China’s recent membership in
the WTO requires it to establish an internationally-recognized independent legal system.
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See Interview with Zhao Shiyan, supra note XX.
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Chinese officials have slowly allowed increased independence of the Chinese
judiciary in order to further economic development. The judiciary, recognizing the
importance of protecting foreign investors in China, has produced quite a few directives
towards the lower courts and has attempted to provide education for lower-level judges. But
these steps can only go so far. The political status quo does not permit the rapid expansion of
judicial power, protecting the ultimate superiority of the Communist regime. However, the
education and independence necessary for increased freedom of contract may also result in
increased freedom of speech and religion.
This recent focus on Chinese ADR has also led several American commentators to
consider the adoption of Chinese ADR techniques in American federal courts. Professor
Michael Colatrella recently noted that China’s “court-performed” mediation model could
effectively reduce court expenses while offering increased flexibility and risk avoidance.285
Former U.S. Chief Justice Warren Burger suggested that an increased use of mediation in
courts around the world might stem the current flood of litigation.286
Scholars and practitioners alike eagerly watch to see the effects of the recent foreign
arbitration regulations, as well as which further reforms may be adopted in the Chinese
arbitration system. At its current rate of development, nobody can predict what the next
decade may bring.

285 See Colatrella, supra note 3, at 416.
286 See Ge, supra note 1, at 122.
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